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Using a ¯rm-level panel data set I assess whether dynamic models of in-
vestment provide an empirically fruitful framework for analyzing tax e®ects
on changes in capital stock. In particular I estimate a one-step error correc-
tion model (ECM) complementing the usual estimation of a distributed lag
model. A correction term accounts for non-random sample attrition, which
has not been considered in previous studies on investment even though most
(if not all) panel data sets on ¯rms are incomplete. Both, ECM and dis-
tributed lag model, suggest that user cost of capital and output have an
economically and statistically signi¯cant in°uence on capital formation. In
the ECM, however, estimates are larger in size and match theoretical pre-
dictions more closely. My preferred estimate of -1.3 implies that a decrease
in the user cost of capital by 10 percent will increase the ¯rm's capital stock
by 13 percent, on average. Taking my elasticity estimate to the Corporate
Tax Reform 2008 I would expect that the reform only slightly increases cap-
ital stock, since the rather strong reduction in corporate income tax rate
was partly compensated for by stricter depreciation allowances. Investment
dynamics appear to be crucial for the coe±cients of cash °ow variables
in investment equations. While cash °ow e®ects are present in the (¯rst-
di®erenced) distributed lag model, they vanish in the ECM. This leads me
to conclude that well documented cash °ow e®ects point at dynamic mis-
speci¯cation in previous studies.
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In this paper I assess whether dynamic models of investment provide an empiri-
cally fruitful framework for analyzing tax e®ects on changes in the capital stock.
The main focus of the paper is the estimation of an error correction model which
allows me to model investment dynamics explicitly. So far, drawing on the work by
Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), other studies based on micro data have doc-
umented a signi¯cant response of capital spending to its user cost, where the user
cost of capital combines prices, corporate income tax, allowances, interest, and de-
preciation rates. The empirical framework of these estimations, however, is based
on autoregressive distributed lag models, where short-run dynamics result from an
empirical speci¯cation search rather than being imposed ex ante; long-term e®ects
are simply calculated as the sum of the coe±cients of short-run adjustment.
Under certain testable assumptions, the autoregressive distributed lag model may
be reparameterized as an error correction model. While short-run investment
dynamics are again found from an empirical speci¯cation search, the long-term
formulation of the capital stock in the error correction model is consistent with a
simple neoclassical model of the ¯rm's demand for capital. In the error correction
model, the long-term level of capital thus equals the optimal capital stock, i.e., the
level of capital that maximizes the discounted value of all future income streams.
Since ¯rms' optimal capital stock also depends on its user cost, a fall (rise) in the
user cost of capital will lead ¯rms to expand (reduce) their capital stock. Because
of quadratic adjustment costs or adaptive expectations, they may not fully adapt
in the ¯rst place but slowly shift their capital stock to the optimal one.1 Both the
adjustment process and the long-term equilibrium relationship are distinguishable
in the error correction model.
In the following I will estimate two models: the distributed lag model to compare
results to the existing literature,2 and the error correction model to learn more
1These factors would yield a simple speci¯cation of the form kt = ®0 + ¯0
1Xt + ¯0
2Xt¡1 +
¸kt¡1 + ut, where kt is the capital stock at time t, ¯1 and ¯2 are column vectors of regression
coe±cients, Xt and Xt¡1 are column vectors of explanatory variables at time t and t¡1, and ut
is an unobserved error term.
2Chirinko et al. (1999) and subsequent work have merely assumed extrapolative expectations
1about the dynamics of investment. There are several methodological problems
which include unobserved ¯rm heterogeneity, measurement error in the user cost of
capital (Goolsbee 2000), simultaneity bias (Goolsbee 1998), and lagged dependent
variable in the error correction model. While it seems impossible to control for
these factors on the basis of a single cross section, I argue that the user cost
elasticity can be identi¯ed by taking advantage of a panel and by using GMM
methods. The panel data set I use for the estimations is the Hoppenstedt company
database provided by Hoppenstedt ¯rm information GmbH. The data set covers
the years 1987 to 2007 and contains detailed accounting data for a large number of
German non-¯nancial corporations that are subject to publication requirements.
In spite of a variety of advantages, the use of a long panel data set implies one major
problem, which is sample attrition. The longer the sequence of years, the more
likely it is that ¯rms drop out of the sample. Observations on ¯rms may be missing
for several reasons, including bankruptcy, cessation of business, merger, falling
below thresholds which a®ect publication requirements, etc.. In theory, if ¯rms are
randomly missing, the investment function may be estimated using the incomplete
panel data set as if it was complete. In practice, estimates can be biased without
an appropriate correction if ¯rms are missing for certain speci¯c reasons which are,
conditional on the explanatory variables included in the investment equation, not
independent of the determinants of the decision to invest. In papers on investment,
the fact that most (if not all) panel data sets on ¯rms are incomplete, and the
potential bias associated with this fact, have received little attention. To address
the concern of non-random sample attrition, I include a correction term drawing
on the work by Wooldridge (1995, 2002).
Estimating the ¯rst-di®erenced distributed lag model, I ¯nd a long-term user
cost elasticity of -0.6. These estimates compare to what was documented for
Germany in the literature (Chatelain, Hernando, Generale, von Kalckreuth and
Vermeulen 2001, Harho® and Ramb 2001, von Kalckreuth 2001). The only study
and no adjustment costs. This assumption leads to a distributed lag model which does not
include the lagged dependent variable. Further, Chirinko et al. (1999) estimate the investment
equation in rates of changes to account for large di®erences in ¯rm size, i.e., they estimate a
¯rst-di®erenced distributed lag model.
2with lower estimates for Germany is the study by Ramb (2007). Using the method
of simulated marginal tax rates (Graham 1996), Ramb estimates a long-term elas-
ticity of the simulated marginal tax rate to investment activity between -0.2 and
-0.1.3 The estimation of the error correction model yields a robust, statistically
signi¯cant, and relatively large point estimate of the user cost elasticity. The
point estimate of the long-term elasticity of -1.3 implies that a decrease in the user
cost of capital by 10 percent will increase capital by 13 percent. Further, I ¯nd
that ¯rms quickly adjust to the new optimal capital stock: about half of the gap
between existing and optimal capital stock is closed within a year.
Interestingly, well-known cash °ow e®ects are present in the distributed lag model
but vanish in the error correction model. This ¯nding con°icts with the view that
cash °ow e®ects can be seen as evidence for the importance of ¯nancial constraints
(see, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988, 2000). In fact, it suggests that in
the distributed lag model, cash °ow may act as a proxy for omitted expected fu-
ture pro¯tability variables (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000; Bond, Elston,
Mairesse and Mulkay 2003) which becomes insigni¯cant once the investment equa-
tion is dynamically correctly speci¯ed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brie°y de-
scribes the user cost of capital and argues that the user cost provides su±cient
variation to identify the user cost elasticity. The data set I use in the study and
the empirical methodology are introduced in Section 3. Estimation results of the
¯rst-di®erenced distributed lag model and the error correction model are presented
in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes my main results and concludes.
3In Ramb's study, the simulated tax rate is solely driven by the tax rate, loss o®setting rules,
and the (simulated) tax base. All other e®ects incorporated in the user cost of capital such
as depreciation allowances are assumed to be identical for all ¯rms. For this reason, Ramb's
estimate is not directly comparable to the studies estimating the user cost elasticity, the present
paper included.
32 Firm-speci¯c variation in the UCC
My goal is to estimate the user cost elasticity of investment. Identi¯cation of this
elasticity comes from the user cost of capital (UCC), which varies across ¯rms
and over time. The de¯nition of the UCC in this study is standard and based on
the work by Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), and King and Fullerton
(1984). Following their approach, the UCC is the minimal rate of return a ¯rm
must earn on investments before taxes, i.e., it is the discount rate a ¯rm should
use in evaluating investment projects. As earnings from the investment are taxed
and because the tax system provides for some allowances for investment goods,
the UCC is not only a function of economic variables but also of taxation. This
introduces further variation as major reforms in the tax system have taken place in
Germany in recent years. In the following, I will brie°y present the way I calculate
the user cost of capital. In doing so, I will also introduce those features of the
German tax system that are particularly relevant for the decision to invest.
















t is a price de°ator for investment goods and pS
j;t is the industry j speci¯c
output price at time t. The ratio of these price indices re°ects capital gains (or
losses) that may occur if capital goods' prices are expected to rise (fall) relative
to the prices of output goods. Capital gains alleviate the e®ect of economic de-
preciation (±e
j;a;t) in lowering the asset's value. Assets are assumed to deteriorate
exponentially, which renders the economic depreciation rate invariant to the inter-
est rate (Auerbach 1983). Information on economic depreciation is available at the
industry-level for two di®erent assets a, property with buildings and ¯xed tangible
assets.
To account for deterioration, the tax system provides depreciation allowances.4
4In Germany, an investment tax credit only exists for an initial investment in Eastern Ger-
many (Investitionszulage). There is no investment tax credit for a replacement investment or an
investment in Western Germany.
4Depreciation allowances za;t follow di®erent methods in Germany: While property
with buildings is depreciated on a straight-line basis, ¯xed tangible assets could
be depreciated according to the declining-balance method until 2007. Firms were
allowed to change from the declining-balance to the straight-line method once the
latter was bene¯cial. The rates of depreciation are set in the German income tax
law and in industry-speci¯c tables which are issued by the Federal Ministry of
Finance. In recent years, these rates have been changed regularly (for details see
the Data Appendix A.1). When calculating the discounted value, I take changes
in rates into account and also correct for in°ation, since historical-cost deprecia-
tion acts to increase taxes with in°ation. Note due to data restrictions I can only
consider regular depreciation allowances. Accelerated depreciation allowances for
investment in Eastern Germany which were introduced after reuni¯cation,5 ex-
traordinary depreciation allowances for some industries (e.g., agriculture), and
additional depreciation allowances for small and medium-sized businesses cannot
be taken into account.
The tax rate ¿t includes the corporate income tax rate on retained earnings and
the solidarity surcharge for Eastern Germany.6 The solidarity surcharge was intro-
duced in 1991. Since then, the solidarity surcharge has varied between 0 percent
and 7.5 percent. Corporate income taxation has not only undergone changes in
tax rates but also a fundamental change in the tax system: While the German cor-
porate tax system applied the tax-credit method until 2000, taxation has followed
the half-income method since 2001.7 An overview of all corporate income tax and
5See FÄ ordergebietsgesetz.
6To keep things manageable I only include taxes on pro¯t and do not consider the local
business tax and the real estate tax. The real estate tax ties in with the assessed tax value of
property. The assessed tax value cannot be deduced from the corporate balance sheet information
but is calculated by the local tax authorities based on government tables using criteria such as
the location, age, size, and characteristics of a property. Disregarding the local business tax and
the real estate tax clearly leads to an underestimation of the user cost of capital. Leaving aside
these taxes, however, is without loss of generality for my estimations in ¯rst-di®erences as long as
the collection rates ¯xed by the municipality have not changed over time. Since these collection
rates are very stable over time (see statistics on property taxes), disregarding the local business
tax and the real estate tax should not change results.
7Under the tax-credit method, the tax burden on the corporate level was only meant as a
means to ensure taxation of capital income and was credited against the personal income tax
of the shareholder. Retained pro¯ts were taxed at a much higher rate than distributed pro¯ts.
Under the half income method, the corporate income tax rate is uniform and lower for both
retained and distributed pro¯ts. In return, the corporate income tax is de¯nite since 2001. Half
5solidarity surcharge rates can be found in Appendix A.2.8
Taxation also matters for ¯rms' ¯nancial costs. King and Fullerton (1984) argue
that the ¯rm's ¯nancial cost µi;t in a world of distortionary taxes will di®er from
the market interest rate and, in general, will depend on the source of ¯nance. Con-
sequentially, the authors advocate a measure of ¯nancial cost which is a weighted
average of the ¯nancial costs induced by the di®erent ¯nancial sources, i.e., which
considers a preferential tax treatment of debt.9
As ¯rst pointed out by Hansson and Stuart (1985), such a measure may be less
convincing on closer inspection than it appears at ¯rst glance. Drawing on an
equilibrium perspective, they suggest that additional costs of debt, like bankruptcy
costs, may balance the tax advantage of debt on the margin exactly. This implies
that the di®erence between the rate of return to investment and the rate of return
required by the investor does not always entirely consist of taxes but also of invisible
costs. Then, observable di®erences in tax rates across sources of ¯nance represent
\an equilibrium in which additional marginal costs of using tax-favored sources just
balance the tax advantages of these sources" (Hansson and Stuart 1985, p.829).
Hansson and Stuart thus claim that it is the maximum tax rate across sources of
¯nance that should be taken instead of the weighted average of all sources. Getting
to the bottom of their argument, Sinn (1993) presents a theoretical model of the
¯rm's investment and ¯nancial decisions where invisible costs of debt ¯nance such
as risk of bankruptcy are taken into account. These invisible costs of debt ¯nance
are assumed to depend on the ¯rm's stock of capital or on its stock of equity. In
his\invisible cost model"Sinn shows that Hansen and Stuart have been mistaken:
the (user) cost of capital is a weighted average of the cost of debt and the cost
of retained earnings where the weights are marginal debt-asset and equity-asset
of the dividends are additionally subjected to personal income tax.
8The Hoppenstedt company database does not provide information on tax loss carry-forward.
For that reason, I have to assume that the marginal tax rate ¿t equals the statutory corporate
income tax rate plus solidarity surcharge even though the marginal tax rate ¿t might be zero for
companies whose amount of pro¯t is small relative to the volume of the corporation's tax loss
carry-forward.
9This is in line with the pecking order theory of ¯nancing advocated by Myers and Majluf
(1984) according to which ¯rms prefer internal ¯nancing when available, and prefer debt over
equity if external ¯nancing is required.
6ratios.10
Taking Sinn's ¯nding seriously, I thus calculate ¯rm-speci¯c ¯nancial costs as a
weighted average of after-tax interest rates, where the weights depend on the ¯rm's
mixture of ¯nancial sources. Following King and Fullerton (1984), I thereby distin-
guish three di®erent sources of ¯nance (retained earnings, debt, and new equity)
and two types of investors (private and institutional shareholders). The calcula-
tion of the ¯rm's ¯nancial costs µi;t(ri;t·
f
i;t) is done in two steps. In the ¯rst step,
I compute the after-tax interest rate for every source of ¯nance f depending on
the ¯rm's interest rate ri;t and taxation (Table 1). In the calculation of the after-
tax interest rates I focus on the ¯rm level; unfortunately, I am forced to neglect
personal income taxation, since I do not have any information about a corpora-
tion's shareholders. However, comprehensive information on shareholders and the
sources of their residual income would be necessary to consider personal tax liabil-
ities. This somewhat less precise calculation of the after-tax interest rates impair
results only in the event of personal income tax reforms a®ecting ¯rms di®erently.
General changes in the level of the personal income tax over time (i.e., tax reforms
altering tax rates uniformly over tax brackets) are captured in the deterministic
time trend. Di®erences in the personal income taxation of shareholders across
¯rms that arise because of the ¯rm-speci¯c ¯nancial structure are absorbed in the
¯rm-speci¯c e®ects.
Table 1: After-tax interest rate µt(ri;t) by source of ¯nance and by type of share-
holder
Financing through... private shareholder institutional shareholder
retained earnings µ
retain;p
i;t (ri;t) = ri;t µ
retain;inst
i;t (ri;t) = ri;t
debt µi;t(ri;t)debt;p = ri;t(1 ¡ ¿t) µ
debt;inst













i;t (ri;t) = ri;t(1 ¡ ¿t) µ
new;inst
i;t (ri;t) = ri;t(1 ¡ ¿t)
Source: King and Fullerton (1984), own calculations.
In the second step, these ¯rm-speci¯c after-tax interest rates are weighted with
10The reasonable assumption behind this result is that the additional, invisible cost on debt is
reduced ceteris paribus if equity ¯nancing is increased.
7the ¯rm's share of ¯xed assets ¯nanced by retained earnings (·retain
i;t ), debt (·debt
i;t ),
and new equity (·new
i;t ) at time t.11 I further assume that 70 percent of shareholder


























As pointed out by Weichenrieder (2008), the use of weighted averages also has its
downside: Comparison of ¯nancial costs or the UCC over time (or across countries)
may be blurred, since changes in taxation interact with changes in ¯rms' ¯nancial
structure. He therefore suggests simplifying ¯rm- or industry-speci¯c weighted
averages to the overall cost of debt ¯nance once the Miller equilibrium holds. In
the Miller equilibrium (Miller 1977), a clientele e®ect caused by the interaction of
corporate and personal income taxation assimilates e®ective tax rates for retained
earnings and debt.13 Weichenrieder hence argues that the marginal investor in the
Miller equilibrium should be indi®erent between debt and equity. This leads him
to conclude that in the Miller equilibrium ¯nancial costs can be approximated with
the overall interest rate. He underlines, however, that this approach also comes at
a cost, since both personal income taxation at the shareholder level and corporate
taxation interact. Given that I have to neglect personal income taxation because
of data limitations, I cannot pursue this approach in all details. In a robustness
check, however, I calculate the UCC using the overall yield on corporate bonds
and see results unchanged.
Finally, the overall UCCi;j;t for ¯rm i in industry j at time t is given by the
11Of course, these observable shares do not necessarily coincide with the marginal ratios.
Unfortunately, the marginal ¯nancial structure cannot be deduced from the data. That is why I
use the average within a given year as a proxy.
12Anecdotal evidence suggests that more than 50 percent of the shareholders are institutional
ones (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2007). Experimenting with a segment of institutional shareholders
amounting to 60 percent and 80 percent does not change results at all.
13Highly taxed investors prefer dividends and capital gains, since these sources of income are
taxed at a lower personal income tax rate than interest payments. By contrast, individuals with
low income prefer to save privately and to have interest payments taxed at a low personal income
tax rate.








i;t is the ¯rm-speci¯c share of assets a in total assets. By this means, the
user cost of capital is calculated for each ¯rm. The UCC hence varies because of
changes in taxation and in macroeconomic factors. Most variation, however, stems
from varieties in the ¯rms' ¯nancial structure and in the asset mix they use.
3 Data and estimation strategy
3.1 Data
The principal data requirement for the estimation of the user cost elasticity of
the capital stock are cross-section and time-series micro data for the user cost
of capital and the gross investment rate. For my study, I link two data sources
that each provide information particularly well-suited to my objectives: detailed
company accounting data made available by Hoppenstedt ¯rm information GmbH,
and industry-level information maintained by the German Statistical O±ces and
the German Central Bank.
Hoppenstedt provides accounting data for a large part of German corporations
which are subject to publication requirements. It is hence neither comprehensive
nor representative.14 The data set includes information on time invariant ¯rm char-
acteristics such as industry, region, legal form, and year of foundation. Moreover,
and most importantly for my analysis, the data set covers balance sheet positions
and ¯rms' pro¯t and loss accounts in great detail. In particular, it records ac-
14Unfortunately, I cannot compute the coverage of the Hoppenstedt balance sheet database
concerning the whole corporate sector because it is unknown how much non-¯nancial corporations
in Germany invest per year. Information is available for mining, quarrying, and manufacturing
¯rms (incorporate and non-incorporate companies), which invested about 47.7 billion euro in
1997 (in the middle of my observation period). In the same year, Hoppenstedt corporations in
these industries used in the estimations invested about 21.8 billion euro. Further, companies in
mining, quarrying, and manufacturing all together employed about 7.8 million persons; of which,
4.1 million were employed at corporations in the Hoppenstedt database.
9quisition,15 disposal, and withdrawal of ¯xed assets. This allows me to derive the
¯rm-speci¯c gross investment rate (Ii;t), which is normalized by the replacement
cost value of capital stock (Ki;t¡1). Replacement values are not available in the
data but must be estimated from historic cost data using the perpetual inventory
method. Cash °ow (CFi;t), which is income plus non-cash expenses like depreci-
ation allowances, is also scaled by the beginning-of-period capital stock. Output
is measured by sales (Si;t). Nominal sales data are taken from the Hoppenstedt
net sales ¯gure and de°ated by an industry-speci¯c output price de°ator. The
growth rate of sales is de¯ned as (¢Si;t=Si;t). The derivation of the replacement
cost values of the capital stock and of the other explanatory variables used in my
regression analysis are described in more detail in the Data Appendix A.1.
To calculate the UCC as described before, I complement the data set with infor-
mation on the prices of investment goods (pI
t) and output prices (pS
j;t), as well as
on economic depreciation rates for buildings and ¯xed tangible assets (±e
j;a;t). This
industry-level information is merged with the individual data and was obtained
from the German Statistical O±ces; it is also described in more detail in the Data
Appendix A.1.
At the time of writing this paper the Hoppenstedt company database contained
¯nancial statements from 1987 to 2007. I exclude companies which have changed
their accounting year during this period, so that all sets of accounts used would
cover a 12-month period. Further excluding companies with less than four records,16
and restricting my sample to ¯rms with limited liability, leaves me with an un-
balanced sample of 4,642 non-¯nancial ¯rms. The number of records per ¯rm
varies between four and twenty-one. In the appendix, descriptive statistics are
provided which show the structure of the sample by number of observations per
company (Table A.2), the distribution of observations over years (Table A.3), and
the distribution of ¯rms over industries (Table A.4).
In contrast to what was used in earlier studies for Germany (e.g., Harho® and
15This includes direct purchases of new ¯xed assets and those gained through acquisitions.
16As a minimum I include two lags into my regression analysis. In my analysis, I consider
changes in the explanatory variables, which means that the ¯rm must have been in the data set
in the three preceding years; this implies that I need at least four records per ¯rm.
10Ramb 2001), I exclusively use individual ¯nancial statements. One might object
that subsidiaries do not have a free hand in taking their investment decisions
because of the group structure. Even though there is no information about it, it
seems plausible that it is the mother company (and not subsidiaries) that takes
the decision to invest. Notwithstanding this aspect, I argue that capital formation
depends on the user cost of capital at the ¯rm level - and not at the group level.
This is because depreciation allowances etc. are applied to the ¯rm capitalizing
the good. My argument becomes clearer if we think about a conglomerate, which
consists of subsidiaries active in di®erent industries. If a change in politics raises
the UCC for subsidiary A but reduces it for subsidiary B, this may leave the UCC
at the group level unchanged. However, a change in user cost of capital at the ¯rm
level may well lead subsidiary A to disinvest and subsidiary B to invest. Using
consolidated ¯nancial statements would imply a loss of information, since neither
the change in user cost of capital nor the change in capital might be observed.17
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estima-
tion over the period 1987 to 2007. As noted earlier, the Hoppenstedt company
database contains accounting information for corporations subject to publication
requirements. In Germany, mainly large and very large ¯rms are liable to publica-
tion requirements. This is also re°ected in the average capital stock which amounts
to about 70 million euro. On average, a ¯rm's gross investment represents 13.1
percent of its existing capital stock. This average rate and the median gross in-
vestment to capital ratio (6.2 percent) are compatible with moderate capital stock
growth.18 Both mean and median sales grew very slowly in the sample at a rate
of 0.1 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively. In the observation period, the user
cost of capital grew slightly on average (+1.6 percent) but declined for the median
company (-1.4 percent). A decline in the UCC is exactly what we would expect
as tax reforms signi¯cantly reduced the corporate income tax rate for all compa-
nies; because output prices and economic depreciation rates developed unequally
17A similar argument applies to the question whether data on business units should be used.
Since it is again the ¯rm level where tax rules are applied, I argue that not data on business
units but ¯rm data is appropriate.
18The economic depreciation rate is about 3% to 5% for structures and 8% to 12% for ¯xed
tangible assets.
11over industries, it is nevertheless conceivable that the user cost of capital grew
marginally for some ¯rms.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for micro data
Variable Mean Median Within-¯rm Firm-speci¯c
stand. deviat.a time variationb
Ki;t (in 1,000 euro) 69,498 12,283 23,539 0.998
Ii;t=Ki;t¡1 0.131 0.062 0.192 0.999
Si;t (in 1,000 euro) 268,000 70,700 191,067 0.996
¢Si;t=Si;t¡1 0.001 0.006 0.202 0.995
CFi;t=Ki;t¡1 0.053 0.012 0.118 0.998
UCCi;t 0.140 0.135 0.030 0.782
¢UCCi;t=UCCi;t¡1 0.016 -0.014 0.282 0.940
Number of observations 29,595
Notes: Ii;t=Ki;t¡1 is the ratio of investment to the beginning-of-period capital stock,
Si;t are ¯rms' real sales in 1,000 euro, ¢Si;t=Si;t¡1 is ¯rm sales growth, CFi;t=Ki;t¡1 is
the ratio of ¯rm cash °ow to the beginning-of-period capital stock, UCCi;t is the User
Cost of Capital, and ¢UCCi;t=UCCi;t¡1 is the percentage change in this variable.
a Using mean-di®erenced variables, the within-¯rm standard deviation measures varia-
tion in the time dimension of the panel only.
b Following Chirinko et al. (1999), this measure is computed as one minus the R2 statistic
from a regression of each mean-di®erenced variable on a set of time dummies.
Source: Hoppenstedt company database, own calculations, 1987 to 2007.
The within-¯rm standard deviation shows that there is substantial variability over
time. This is particularly true for changes in the user cost of capital which are
driven by tax reforms, ¯nancing costs, and price trends. Identi¯cation, however, is
not mainly based on aggregate time trends but on ¯rm-speci¯c variation. Drawing
on the calculations in Chirinko et al. (1999), I measure the ¯rm-speci¯c time
variation as one minus the R2 statistic from a regression of each mean-di®erenced
variable on a set of time dummies. The ¯rm-speci¯c time variation in the data
that is not due to aggregate time e®ects is given in the last column of Table 2.
This proportion is high for the variables in rows one to ¯ve where it amounts
to more than 99 percent. It is lower for the user cost of capital because to a
larger extent variation in the UCC is determined by aggregate factors such as
tax rates or price trends. Firm-speci¯c variation is further reduced as I do not
have ¯rm-speci¯c economic depreciation rates or price indices but have to resort
to industry-level information. These aggregate factors, albeit important, do not
fully explain time-series variation in the user cost of capital. On the contrary, there
is still substantial micro-level variation as 78 percent of the variation in the UCC
12is due to ¯rm-speci¯c factors.
3.2 Models and estimation strategy
The main focus of the paper is to estimate both short-term and long-term e®ects
of changes in corporate taxation on a ¯rm's investment decision and capital stock.
While the error correction model has the drawback of relying less on theory, it has
the advantage of imposing less structure than Q or Euler equation models (Bond,
Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay 2003). In particular, it does not require quadratic
adjustment costs.19 Even though the error correction model cannot be explicitly
derived from a dynamic optimization problem such as Q or Euler models, the long-
term formulation for the level of capital is consistent with a simple neoclassical
model of the ¯rm's demand for capital. This and the dynamics in its modeling
makes the error correction model superior to the (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed
lag model, which is the prevailing empirical speci¯cation. In the following, I will
estimate both the error correction and the distributed lag model, and use the latter
to compare results to the existing literature. Before brie°y describing both models
in the next paragraphs, I will ¯rst introduce the relationship between capital, the
user cost of capital, and output.
3.2.1 The optimal capital stock
The demand for capital and, in a dynamic perspective, the demand for investment
can be derived from the ¯rst-order conditions of pro¯t-maximizing behavior with
static expectations (Eisner and Nadiri 1968). Using a production function with
constant elasticity of substitution (¾) between capital and labor,20 the optimal
capital stock K¤
i;t for ¯rm i at time t can be written (Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and
19Quadratic adjustment costs have been criticized as empirically implausible (Doms and Dunne
1998) and too strict in the context of investment under (partial) irreversibility (Dixit and Pindyck
1994).
20A production function with constant elasticity of substitution nests Leontief (¾ = 0) and
Cobb-Douglas (¾ = 1) production functions.







where ¯ = ¾ + 1¡¾
º .
The optimal level of capital depends on a ¯rm's level of output or sales Si;t, on
a ¯rm-speci¯c distribution parameter Ai explaining ¯rm-speci¯c relative factor
shares of labor and capital,21 on technology Tt as well as on the ¯rm's user cost
of capital as de¯ned in equations (1) and (3). In this partial analysis, the optimal
capital stock is independent of the wage level, i.e., companies are assumed to be
price-takers on the labor market.22 Note the elasticity of capital to sales is unity
(¯ = 1) if the production function has constant returns to scale (º = 1) or if the
elasticity of substitution equals one (¾ = 1), i.e., with a Cobb-Douglas production
function. The parameter of interest in this paper is the long-term elasticity of
capital stock with respect to the UCC which is given by ¡¾.
In a frictionless world, the log of the current optimal capital stock k¤
i;t is simply a
long-linear function of current sales in log (si;t), logarithmized current user cost of








If, however, costs of adjustment and uncertainty are introduced, the current capital
stock depends on both, the current values of sales and user cost of capital in logs
and the past values of these variables as well as of the capital stock.23 Appending
21Beyond ¯rm-speci¯c relative factor shares, the parameter might also capture a ¯rm-speci¯c
price markup in monopolistic markets.
22In the econometric analysis di®erences in the wage level over time and across ¯rms are
captured in the deterministic time trend and in the ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects.
23Adjustment costs are assumed to be a function either of the rate of gross or net investment
and are rationalized by reference to the costs of disruption, the training of workers, management
problems and the like (e.g., Eisner and Strotz 1963, Lucas 1967, Gould 1968, Treadway 1969).
They may also be justi¯ed by reference to supply side factors, by supposing that the supply
curve of capital goods to the ¯rm is upward sloping (e.g., Foley and Sidrauski 1970, 1971).
Nickell (1977) rationalizes lags by combining delivery lags and uncertainty. Harvey (1990) neatly
14a stochastic error term "i;t the current capital stock can be expressed as follows:












¿dt + "i;t: (6)
It is important to note that expectational variables in the process generating the
data imply potential problems in the estimation of short-run e®ects and long-term
solutions. To be precise, the investment equation cannot be identi¯ed without
knowledge of the series underlying the expectation formation process. Since in that
case the explanatory variables are not contemporaneously uncorrelated with the er-
ror term for the parameters of interest, short-run and long-term e®ects are possibly
not consistently estimated. As is shown in more detail by Banerjee, Dolado, Gal-
braith and Hendry (1993), however, non-stationarity of capital and co-integration
between capital, sales, and user cost of capital can lead to consistent estimation of
the long-term solution in an error correction framework in spite of the lack of weak
exogeneity. Nevertheless, in the presence of expectational variables, the short-run
coe±cients remain mis-estimated in the error correction model, too. For this rea-
son, I will mainly focus on the long-run coe±cient that are consistently estimated
in either case.
3.2.2 The (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag model
Since ¯rm-data are usually right skewed and show large di®erences in ¯rm size,
Eisner and Nadiri (1968) and Chirinko et al. (1999) propose to specify the equation
for capital with all variables as ratios or rates. Taking di®erences of equation (6)
and accounting for partial adjustment and extrapolative expectations leads to the










¾h¢ucci;t¡h + ¢"i;t: (7)
distinguishes both e®ects. He shows that in a world with adaptive expectations, the optimal
capital stock depends on lagged sales and user cost of capital whereas the currently optimal
capital stock depends on lagged capital stock if capital is only partially adjusted.
15Next, the change in capital can be approximated by investment. For this purpose
I divide investment into replacement components (Ir
t ) and net investment (Inet
t ).
Following Chirinko et al. (1999) I assume that capital depreciates geometrically at a
¯rm-speci¯c constant rate (±i), which varies with a ¯rm's mix of capital assets; this
means that replacement investment is proportional to the capital stock available
at the beginning of the year. Net investment is the change in the capital stock





i;t = ±iKi;t¡1 + (Ki;t ¡ Ki;t¡1): (8)
I then scale investment by the beginning-of-year capital stock and use equation (8)






' ki;t ¡ ki;t¡1: (9)















¾h¢ucci;t¡h + ¢"i;t: (10)
In their seminal paper, Chirinko et al. (1999) did not include the lagged dependent
variable and simpli¯ed the model above to a (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag
model. As the latter model has since prevailed in the literature, I estimate their
simpli¯ed speci¯cation, too.24 Similarly, I also include cash °ow relative to the
existing capital stock as a measure of liquidity (cf. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen


















24Unlike, for instance, Chatelain et al. (2001) and Harho® and Ramb (2001) I do not think
that time trends in growth rates are sensible and for this reason do not include time dummies
into the ¯rst-di®erenced equation.
16It is worth noting that a signi¯cant cash °ow e®ect can re°ect the presence of
¯nancing constraints on investment. However, its is well known that ¯nancial
constraints are not the only possible interpretation of signi¯cant coe±cients on
the cash °ow variables. If investment depends on expected future sales and if cash
°ow acts as a proxy for these omitted expected future pro¯tability variables, cash
°ow coe±cients would be signi¯cant even in the absence of ¯nancing constraints
(e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000).
In the estimation equation above, the long-term user cost elasticity of capital is
captured by the sum of the ¾'s. There is no explicit modeling of the equilibrium
relationship between capital, output, and user cost of capital. To learn more about
this long-term relationship and the dynamics of investment, I also estimate an error
correction model, which is derived in the next paragraph.
3.2.3 The error correction model
The error correction model was ¯rst introduced into the investment literature by
Bean (1981). The main idea is to nest a long-term speci¯cation for the ¯rm's de-
mand for capital (depending on sales and the user cost of capital) within a regres-
sion setting that immediately yields parameters describing the extent of short-run
adjustment to disequilibrium. As a prerequisite, capital, sales, and the user cost
of capital must be co-integrated. Whether this holds can be tested using a panel
co-integration test (Westerlund 2007).25 Once the variables are co-integrated, the
parameter estimates are consistent and follow the standard normal distribution
asymptotically, i.e., usual t-tests are valid.
Reparameterizing equation (6),26 reducing the auto-regressive component to one
lag, and approximating the change in capital stock by equation (9) leads to the
25I am aware of the fact that the test has higher power in samples where T is substantially
larger than N. Even in small samples, however, the Westerlund test outperforms residual-based
panel co-integration tests (Westerlund 2007).
26For reparametrization one has to replace ki;t by ki;t = ki;t¡1+¢ki;t. Subtracting and adding
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where ¿0 = ¡ 1
(Á¡1)¿ and ´0
i = ¡ 1
(Á¡1)(ai + ±i).
This estimation equation separates out short-run and long-term e®ects of a change
in sales or user cost of capital. Immediate e®ects of a change in the user cost
of capital are captured by ®0, i.e., a reduction in the UCC by 10 percent will
immediately increase capital by ®0 times 10 percent. Further, a change in the
UCC will in°uence capital in the long-run, since capital, user cost of capital, and
output also have an equilibrium relationship. This equilibrium e®ect is given by
¡¾.
It is important to underline, however, that ¡¾ in the error correction model is
not directly comparable to what is estimated as long-term elasticity in the estima-
tion equation according to Chirinko et al. (1999): They estimate equation (6) in
changes without including lagged capital (¯rst-di®erenced distributed lag model);
the error correction model is a direct reparametrization of equation (6), i.e., of the
autoregressive distributed lag model in levels.
The term (Á ¡ 1) in the error correction model reveals how fast ¯rms adapt their
capital stock to the optimal one in equilibrium. If (Á¡1) is small in absolute value,
capital is slowly adjusted while it quickly comes close to its equilibrium value if
(Á ¡ 1) is large in absolute terms. As a general rule, error correcting behavior
requires that (Á¡1) is negative. A negative coe±cient implies that a capital stock
below the optimal level is associated with investment and vice versa. Whether
the actual capital stock is below or above its equilibrium value can be seen from
the term in squared brackets, which also involves the variables in levels. If levels
were omitted only short-run dynamics would be picked up which is inappropriate
as long as capital adjusts slowly.
The\classical"error correction model is estimated in two steps (Engle and Granger
181987). First, the long-term parameters are estimated by running a static regres-
sion in levels. Second, the dynamics are estimated using the error correction
term, which is the residuals from the static regression. Stock (1987) and Banerjee,
Dolado, Hendry and Smith (1986) present evidence that this estimator is consis-
tent if the variables are co-integrated but may lead to a ¯nite sample bias. In
practice, this ¯nite sample bias might be of particular importance if the error term
is autocorrelated. In either case, the proceeding leads to inconsistent standard
errors of the equilibrium estimates. To avoid biased estimates in small samples
and to facilitate the estimation of the equilibrium parameters, Bewley (1979) pro-
posed a one-step error correction model that I will adopt in the following. The
Bewley transformed version of the error correction model allows for a single-step
















¿dt + ai + "i;t;
(13)
where c0
ECM = cECM ¡ (Á ¡ 1)c, #0 = 1 + (Á ¡ 1), ¾0 = ¡(Á ¡ 1)¾ = ¡(#0 ¡ 1)¾,
and ¯0 = ¡(Á ¡ 1)¯ = ¡(#0 ¡ 1)¯.
While the short-run e®ects in the Bewley transformed model directly correspond
to the ones estimated in two-steps, the long-term impact of the user cost on capital
must be calculated as ¡¾ = ¾0
#0¡1. The standard error for the long-term multiplier
is not directly estimated but can be derived with the help of the delta method.
Note one could also estimate a di®erent version of the model, which is appealing,
since long-term multipliers come along directly with their standard error.27 This
27This model can be written as follows:
ki;t = c00









¡ ¾ucci;t¡1 + ¯si;t¡1 +
T¡1 X
t=1
¿dt + ai + "i;t;
with c00
ECM = 1
1¡Ác, #00 = ¡ 1
1¡ÁÁ, ¹h
00 = ¡ 1
1¡Á¹h, and ®h
00 = ¡ 1
1¡Á®h.
19model, however, also comes at a cost, since the short-run e®ects are not for direct
reading.28 For this reason, I prefer the Bewley-transformed error correction model.
3.2.4 Estimation strategy
The Bewley-transformed error correction model includes the lagged dependent
variable. Because the lagged dependent variable in panel data is necessarily corre-
lated with a ¯rm-speci¯c e®ect,29 a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regres-
sion is biased and inconsistent. The estimation of the Bewley-transformed error
correction model thus calls for an instrumental variable (IV) technique.
Besides the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, there are two more reasons
to use instruments. First, Goolsbee (2000) has shown that the coe±cient of the user
cost of capital in an OLS regression is considerably biased towards zero because of
measurement error in the UCC (attenuation bias). As, for instance, information
on economic depreciation rates is not available for each single ¯rm but only at
the industry level, measurement error is probably also present in my user cost
variable. Second, with an upward sloping supply curve for capital, a reduction in
tax rates drives up prices in the short-run, which in turn might inhibit an expected
increase in investment (Goolsbee 1998, 2004). I therefore have to deal with a
simultaneity bias between the UCC and investment shocks which distorts the user
cost elasticity towards zero. A similar argument suggests that simultaneity between
investment shocks and interest rates biases the coe±cient of the user cost of capital
(Chirinko et al. 1999). Further, investment shocks may be contemporaneously
correlated with output and cash °ow. Both measurement error and simultaneity
bias require an instrumental variable estimation which results in consistent and
unbiased estimates.
I therefore estimate the dynamic regression model above using Generalized
28They must be calculated as ¹h = ¡¹00
h(1¡Á) and as ®h = ¡®00
h(1¡Á) which is a bit tedious,
since the velocity of adjustment (Á ¡ 1) is not directly estimated. As (Á ¡ 1) is negative, this
implies that all short-run e®ects are given with opposite sign.
29Such unobserved ¯rm characteristics might be a ¯rm's capacity for innovation or managerial
abilities. The ¯rm-speci¯c e®ect can also be interpreted as a component of the usual rate of
investment at which the ¯rm's adjustment costs are zero.
20Method of Moments (GMM) which controls for biases due to endogenous explana-
tory variables and ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. In the paper, I report results for the hetero-
scedasticity-robust two-step\System-GMM". This estimator uses the lagged levels
of dependent and independent variables as instruments for the di®erence equation
and the lagged di®erence of dependent and independent variables as instruments
for the level equation (Blundell and Bond 1998).30 Since standard errors in the
usual two-step GMM estimator are downward biased in ¯nite samples, the Wind-
meijer correction is used (Windmeijer 2005).
Only in the absence of higher-order serial correlation in the error "i;t, does the
GMM estimator provide consistent estimates of the parameters in the investment
equation. To test for second-order serial correlation in the di®erenced residuals,
I use the Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond 1991).31 In this context I also
report robust Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions.
The last methodological topic I want to raise is sample attrition. Since I use panel
data over a horizon of twenty years, I see ¯rms dropping out of my sample. The
reasons for attrition are manifold, they include bankruptcy, cessation of business,
merger, and falling below the thresholds for disclosure requirement. If ¯rms are
randomly missing, sample attrition will not bias results; the investment function
could be estimated using the incomplete panel data set as if it was complete.
However, one might argue that dropping out of the sample does not randomly
occur but is related to investment. There might be unobservable characteristics
a®ecting the survival of ¯rms or their size relevant to publication requirements
30I do not report results estimated with \Di®erence-GMM" (Arellano and Bond 1991) and
\Forward-GMM" (Arellano and Bover 1995). These estimators can be subject to large ¯nite-
sample biases, since the correlation between the explanatory variables in di®erences and their
lagged levels becomes weak in highly persistent series (Blundell and Bond 1998). One indication
of whether these biases are likely to be serious can be obtained by OLS levels and within-groups
estimates which are biased upwards and downwards, respectively. These estimations show that
¯rms' capital stock is highly persistent: an OLS regression of the current capital stock on the
one in the previous year leads to a coe±cient of 0.95 and the within estimation to an estimate
of 0.70.
31For consistent estimation, the error "i;t is required to be serially uncorrelated. If "i;t are
serially uncorrelated, then ¢"i;t are necessarily correlated with ¢"i;t¡1, but ¢"i;t will not be
correlated with ¢"i;t¡k for k ¸ 2. If the estimation requirements are ful¯lled, I therefore expect
to reject the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in the ¯rst-di®erenced errors at order 1
but not at order 2.
21which are correlated with unobservable ¯rm characteristics that also a®ect the
decision to invest.32 In this case, estimation of the investment function without an
appropriate correction can be biased. Surprisingly, this problem has received little
attention in papers on investment so far. To allay doubts about the unbiasedness
of my estimates, I include a term which corrects for sample attrition. Following
a three-step procedure proposed by Wooldridge (1995, 2002),33 I ¯rst estimate
the probability of dropping out of the sample in the following period. In probit
models, this probability is estimated separately for each year.34 Second, I calculate
the inverse Mills ratio for each period (¸(xidt)) and third, add it to the estimation
equation. Since usual standard errors are inconsistent, I bootstrap standard errors
in all regressions.
4 Results
In this section, I present regression estimates for the user cost elasticity. I begin
with GMM results for the (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag model, which elimi-
nates ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects and accounts for possible endogeneity problems. The
Westerlund panel co-integration test (Westerlund 2007) reveals co-integration be-
tween capital, user cost of capital, and sales (Table A.5). The test result thus calls
for a speci¯cation that nests the equilibrium relationship. For this reason, I esti-
32If attrition only operates through the ¯rm-speci¯c, time-invariant e®ect ai (±i), ¯rst-
di®erencing the estimation equation solves selection. By contrast, if attrition operates both
through ai (±i) and "i;t a correction term is needed.
33Errors in the selection equation are allowed to display serial correlation and unconditional
heteroscedasticity but are assumed to be normally distributed. The procedure does not impose
distributional assumptions about the error term and the ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects in the equation of
interest. The unobserved e®ect and regressors are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated and attri-
tion may depend on the unobserved e®ect. Though, the correction procedure requires that the
functional form of the conditional mean of the ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects in the equation of interest is
speci¯ed. Further, the cross-section observations are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed. In the original model the assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressor is im-
posed. Wooldridge, however, argues that it is possible to allow for variables that are not strictly
exogenous under reasonable extensions of the assumptions.
34Explanatory variables in this estimation are: Firm size (number of employees, balance sheet
total), variables indicating economic di±culties (reduction in employees by more than 10 percent
compared to the previous year, annual loss), and year of foundation.
22mate the one-step Bewley-transformed error correction model.35 This estimation
leads to my preferred, relatively large estimate of the user cost elasticity, which is
about -1.3 in the long-run.
4.1 Estimates comparable to the literature
Table 3 presents GMM estimates of equation (11), with and without cash °ow. The
instruments used were at least twice lagged values of the explanatory variables,
which allows for contemporaneous correlation between these variables and shocks
to the investment equation, as well as correlation with unobserved ¯rm-speci¯c
e®ects. Hence, current user cost of capital, output, and cash °ow are treated as
being potentially endogenous. In addition to the Sargan-Test for overidentifying
restrictions, I also report the Arellano-Bond-Test testing for serial correlation in
the di®erenced residuals.
The estimates in Table 3 are directly comparable to the existing literature using
distributed lag models. As noted before, the (long-term) user cost elasticity in this
model is given by the sum of ¾'s. Estimating the model without cash °ow I ¯nd an
elasticity of -0.55 while it amounts to about -0.62 when I include cash °ow. In the
model without cash °ow the null hypothesis of capital being inelastic with respect
to its user cost can be rejected at the 5%-level, while the variable is signi¯cant at
every conventional signi¯cance level in the model including cash °ow.
Compared to the existing literature, my point estimates without and with cash
°ow are surprisingly similar,36 even though there are several di®erences between
my estimation and previous studies: First, Harho® and Ramb (2001), von Kalck-
reuth (2001) and Chatelain et al. (2001) use consolidated and not individual ¯-
nancial statements as I do. Second, all three studies use the German Central
Bank's corporate balance sheet database. This data set may be sampled dif-
ferently as it does not rely on publication requirements but originates from the
35As a supplement, I also provide results for the \classical" two-step error correction model in
the appendix (Table A.6).
36Compared to the elasticity of -0.25 estimated by Chirinko et al. (1999) for the US, the user
cost elasticity of German companies seems to be larger in general.
23Table 3: Results estimated with (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag model and Gen-
eralized Method of Moments























Number of ¯rms 3,968 3,968
(Number of observations) (24,762) (24,762)
Sargan-Test (p-value) 0.999 0.787
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-value), order 1 0.090 0.155
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-value), order 2 0.788 0.636
Notes: Estimates with micro data and Generalized Method of Moments as described in
the text. A full set of time dummies is included. Bootstrapped standard errors are in
parentheses. The instruments for the ¯rst-di®erenced regression are the values (in levels)
of ¢ucci;t lagged two through nine years and ¢si;t and CFi;t=Ki;t¡1 lagged two through
three years.
Source: Hoppenstedt company database, own calculations, 1987 to 2007.
Central Bank's function of performing credit assessments within the scope of its
rediscount-lending operations (for details and additional bibliographical references
see von Kalckreuth 2001). Third, previous studies do not explicitly control for sam-
ple attrition while a correction term is included in all speci¯cations in the present
study.37 Since a two-sided t-test reveals that the correction term (¸(xidt)) is sta-
37In ¯rst-di®erence estimations, time-invariant sampling schemes are purged from the regres-
sion by ¯xed e®ects. If the sampling, however, has changed, explicit selection correction is
warranted.
24tistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 1%-level (without cash °ow) and
5%-level (with cash °ow), ¯rms indeed seem to leave the data set non-randomly.
Thus uncontrolled sample attrition potentially biased results in earlier studies.
However, comparing regression results from Table 3 to the coe±cients estimated
in a model without selection correction does not show any important di®erences.38
This indicates that, even though companies drop out of the sample non-randomly,
controlling for sample attrition has almost no e®ect on the user cost elasticity, at
least for the Hoppenstedt database.
Similar to what was found in the literature before, the sum of the coe±cients of
sales is clearly below one (point estimate of 0.10 without and 0.14 with cash °ow)
and not compatible to what is usually assumed in theory.39 The point estimate for
cash °ow, by contrast, is statistically signi¯cant and relatively large: Increasing
cash °ow by 10 percent immediately increases capital by 1 percent. Insofar as
cash °ow seems to be an important determinant of investment, omitting it from
the estimation equation will lead to an omitted variable bias in the estimated user
cost elasticity if the user cost of capital and cash °ow are correlated.
In general, cash °ow e®ects are interpreted either as evidence for the importance of
¯nancial constraints (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988, 2000) or as a proxy
for future pro¯tability (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000). Di®erentiating the
\¯nancial" versus the \fundamental" determinants of investment is fruitful, since
¯nancial frictions might translate into important e±ciency costs of pro¯t taxation
(Keuschnigg and Ribi 2009). In the following, I will argue that cash °ow e®ects
may result from dynamic misspeci¯cation, since they disappear once investment
dynamics are correctly speci¯ed within the error correction model. This is in line
with what was found by Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (2003) in the context
of ¯nancial factors and investment.
38Results can be obtained upon request.
39As shown in Section 3.2.1 constant returns to scale imply a point estimate of one. A point
estimate below one implies increasing returns to scale.
254.2 Investment dynamics
Since the ¯rst-di®erenced distributed lag model does not account for the equi-
librium relationship between capital, sales, and user cost, I prefer estimating an
error correction model. As discussed above, this model can be used to estimate
the long-term elasticity of the capital stock with respect to its user cost, while
allowing for the fact that this adjustment does not occur immediately. Because
of the drawbacks associated with the\classical"two-step error correction model, I
con¯ne these results to the appendix (Table A.6) and exclusively present results
of the single-step estimation in the main text.
The GMM results for the one-step error correction model are summarized in
Table 4. Beforehand, the estimation results have undergone several robustness
check and are not sensitive to the instrumentation choices.40
First, I refer to regression results in column (1) which is without cash °ow. All
point estimates have the expected sign. The long-term user cost elasticity is cal-
culated as ¡¾0 divided by ¡(1 ¡ #0). This yields a statistically signi¯cant and
relatively large long-term multiplier which amounts to -1.29 (standard error of
0.18). Hence, a rise in the user cost of capital by 10 percent decreases capital
by about 13 percent in the long run. A two-sided Chi-square test suggests that
the elasticity is not statistically di®erent from minus one (p-value: 0.107).41 Com-
pared to the point estimate of -0.6 in the previous section, the coe±cient appears
rather large. It is, however, not uncommon that equilibrium elasticities are large
vis-µ a-vis the e®ects estimated in distributed lag models: Exploiting co-integration
methods, Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) estimate the long-term rela-
tionship between logarithmized capital-output ratio and user cost of capital. They
report an average elasticity of investment with respect to capital of -1.0, the neo-
classical benchmark. Cummins, Hassett, Hubbard, Hall and Caballero (1994) use
tax reforms as natural experiments for evaluating the responsiveness of investment
40Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999), Harho® and Ramb (2001), and von Kalckreuth (2001)
report on instability in their estimation results regarding the choice of instruments.
41Of course, the model could be also estimated under the restriction of a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. To allow for a maximum of °exibility, I estimate the model without restriction
but use the parameter estimate for a plausibility check.
26Table 4: Results estimated with one-step error correction model and Gener-
alized Method of Moments




Selection correction (¸(xidt)) -0.082 -0.087
(0.018) (0.019)
User cost of capital (¾0) -0.881 -0.861
(0.138) (0.145)





















Number of ¯rms 3,968 3,968
(Number of observations) (24,762) (24,762)
Sargan-Test (p-value) 0.775 0.642
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-value), order 1 0.002 0.007
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-value), order 2 0.366 0.273
Notes: Estimates with micro data and Generalized Method of Moments as de-
scribed in the text. A full set of time dummies is included. Bootstrapped standard
errors are in parentheses. The instruments for the ¯rst-di®erenced regression are
the values (in levels) of ¢ucci;t and ¢si;t lagged two through seven years.
Source: Hoppenstedt company database, own calculations, 1987 to 2007.
to its user cost and ¯nd long-term elasticities between -0.5 and -1.0. In an ear-
lier study based on aggregate data, Caballero (1994) reports an elasticity of the
capital-output ratio to the cost of capital close to minus one.42
42Note that researchers who have worked with aggregate data have had great di±culty in
providing empirical evidence that taxes matter for capital formation (cf. Chirinko 1993; Caballero
1999; Hassett and Hubbard 2002 for surveys of this literature). The reasons for the failure were
27The coe±cients on the short-run e®ects show that companies relatively quickly
adjust to a change in user cost of capital. ®0 implies that a reduction of the user
cost by 10 percent will immediately increase capital by 5 percent, i.e., about half
of the gap between current and optimal stock of capital is closed in the ¯rst year.
This ¯nding might be important news for policymakers who can stimulate short-
term capital spending and stabilize business °uctuations by lowering the user cost
of capital.
Let me now turn to the equilibrium relationship between capital and sales. The
long-term e®ect of output on capital is given by ¡¯0 divided by ¡(1¡#0). At 0.65
(standard error of 0.10), the e®ect of output on capital in equilibrium is larger
than what was found in the ¯rst-di®erenced distributed lag model but still implies
increasing returns to scale; a two-sided Chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis of
constant returns to scale at any conventional level (p-value: 0.000). Since the data
set in this study mainly contains large corporations which potentially bene¯t from
increasing return to scale, a point estimate below one is plausible.43 In either case,
the estimate is much closer to theoretical predictions than the estimate usually
found in distributed lag models. Again, the coe±cients on the short-run e®ects of
sales on capital suggest that companies relatively quickly shift their capital stock
if sales increase or decrease.
The coe±cient on the selection term is highly signi¯cant. To determine whether
estimates in earlier studies on investment, not accounting for non-random sample
attrition, have been biased, I compare the point estimates to a regression without
correction term. The comparison again shows that there is virtually no di®erence
between the estimates of the two regressions.44 This implies, at least for the data
set used in this study, that sample attrition is present but does not a®ect the user
various: insu±cient variation in the user cost of capital to identify tax e®ects, measurement
error in that investment depends upon observed current and expected future values of many
fundamentals, and small samples problems of co-integrating procedures that tend to downward
bias the user cost elasticity particularly when adjustment costs are important.
43Note this does not con°ict with an equilibrium perspective, since optimal, ¯nite ¯rm size
might be de¯ned by other factors such as managerial capacity limits or provisions on the em-
ployment rights of employees operating the machines, which are more generous for employees
working for larger ¯rms (e.g., employees of larger ¯rms are entitled to a works council). Firm
growth may also be limited by legal rules or the antitrust agency.
44Results can be obtained upon request.
28cost elasticity.
Let me now turn to the regression including cash °ow (Table 4, column (2)). First
of all, the estimation results show that including cash °ow in the regression equa-
tion does not change results. Second, the point estimate for cash °ow is close to
zero and insigni¯cant. Since both results also hold if several lags of cash °ow are
introduced, I do not reproduce results here. This ¯nding contradicts signi¯cant
cash °ow e®ects in the distributed lag model but is in line with results reported by
other researchers. Not including the user cost of capital, Bond, Elston, Mairesse
and Mulkay (2003) analyze the e®ects of output and cash °ow on capital in dif-
ferent countries. They remark that signi¯cant cash °ow e®ects have been present
in restricted reduced-form speci¯cations but have vanished in more complete dy-
namic speci¯cations. They therefore conclude that \there is some indication that
the cash-°ow variables proxy for omitted dynamics in simpler dynamic speci¯ca-
tions"(Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay 2003, p.160).45 To be precise, ¯nancial
variables may appear to be signi¯cant in distributed lag models, even though they
play no role in the structural model for investment but merely help to forecast
future values of the fundamental determinants of investment.46 For this reason,
I cannot concur with other authors (e.g., Harho® and Ramb 2001) stating that
the (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag model produces the most appropriate esti-
mation results. On the contrary, I suspect well documented cash °ow e®ects in
the distributed lag model may appear merely because of dynamic misspeci¯cation.
Accounting for co-integration between capital, user cost of capital, and sales, I
further ¯nd more plausible estimates for the long-term e®ect of output on capital
than in the distributed lag model.
For these reasons, my preferred speci¯cation is the one-step error correction model
45Another strand of the literature associates signi¯cant cash °ow e®ects with measurement er-
rors in Q-models. For instance, Bond, Klemm, Newton-Smith, Syed and Vlieghe (2004) ¯nd that
cash °ow e®ects disappear when analysts' earnings expectations are included in the investment
regression. Similarly, Erickson and Whited (2000) use information in higher-order moments to
control for measurement error in q and obtain insigni¯cant cash °ow coe±cients. An overview
of the associated literature is given in Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006).
46This shows that reduced form models are subject to the famous Lucas critique (Lucas 1976)
because parameters of the structural adjustment process are interfused with parameters of the
expectation formation process.
29without cash °ow. This speci¯cation gives an estimate for the long-run e®ect of
the user cost of capital on capital formation of -1.29. The user cost of capital,
however, is in°uenced by a mixture of variables including interest rate, tax rate,
economic depreciation rate etc.. That is, it cannot be directly in°uenced by poli-
cymakers who can only determine depreciation allowances, tax rates, and the ¯scal
treatment of di®erent ¯nancial sources. To evaluate the e®ect of changes in these
variables on the user cost of capital and the capital stock, I simulate the policy
implications of the most recent tax reform in Germany, the Corporate Tax Reform
2008 (Unternehmensteuerreform 2008). This reform reduced the uniform corpo-
rate income tax rate from 25 percent to 15 percent. At the same time, the tax
base was broadened by deteriorating depreciation allowances. In particular, the
option to depreciate ¯xed assets according to the declining-balance method was
abolished. Ceteris paribus, the lowering of the corporate income tax rate led to
a reduction in the user cost of capital; this decrease, however, was partly com-
pensated for by the deterioration of depreciation allowances. In my sample, the
reform lowered the user cost of capital by 0.08 percent, on average.47 Applying my
elasticity estimate of -1.29, I would expect that the reform increases capital stock
by only 0.11 percent in the long run. Hence, any expectation of a large increase
in investment because of the reform seems inappropriate, since the rather strong
reduction in corporate income tax rate was undermined by stricter depreciation
allowances.
5 Conclusion
Using a ¯rm-level panel data set I estimate the user cost elasticity of capital in a
dynamic framework. More precisely, I estimate an error correction model where
short-run adjustments and long-term equilibrium e®ects can be distinguished. So
far, drawing on the work by Chirinko et al. (1999), other studies based on mi-
cro data have focused on (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag models, which do not
explicitly allow for an equilibrium relationship between capital, its user cost, and
47In 2001, the average user cost of capital was 0.14589; applying the tax rules 2008 yields a
user cost of capital of 0.14577 ceteris paribus.
30sales. Short-run dynamics result from an empirical speci¯cation search rather than
being imposed ex ante; long-term e®ects are simply calculated as the sum of the
coe±cients of short-run adjustment.
To account for non-random sample attrition which may bias estimation results,
all regressions include a term correcting for ¯rms dropping out of the sample.
Surprisingly, this issue has not been raised in previous studies even though most
(if not all) panel data sets on ¯rms are incomplete and estimates may be biased for
this reason. While the coe±cient of the selection term is statistically signi¯cant,
it is found to be of minor importance for the estimation of the user cost elasticity,
at least for the Hoppenstedt database used in this study.
First, I estimate the popular (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag model to compare
results to estimates from previous studies. This regression setting yields a user
cost elasticity of -0.6 which is very similar to what was found by Harho® and
Ramb (2001) (-0.4), von Kalckreuth (2001) (-0.5), and Chatelain et al. (2001)
(-0.7). Similar to what was previously found in the literature, the (¯rst-di®erenced)
distributed lag model leads to implausible low point estimates for output which
casts doubt on the validity of these estimates.
Second, as a novel contribution to the literature on tax e®ects in investment equa-
tions, I estimate an error correction model. Since the \classical" two-step error
correction model su®ers potentially from ¯nite sample biases, I mainly rely on a
one-step Bewley-transformed error correction model. My estimation yields a ro-
bust, statistically signi¯cant, and relatively large user cost elasticity. My preferred
estimate of -1.3 implies that a decrease in the user cost of capital by 10 percent will
increase the ¯rm's capital stock by 13 percent, on average. Taking my elasticity
estimate to the Corporate Tax Reform 2008, the most recent tax reform in Ger-
many, I would expect that the reform only slightly increases capital stock, since
the rather strong reduction in corporate income tax rate was partly compensated
for by stricter depreciation allowances. Further, my preferred speci¯cation shows
that ¯rms quickly adjust to the new optimal capital stock: about half of the gap
between the existing and the optimal capital stock is closed within a year. Imply-
ing increasing return to scale the elasticity of capital towards output seems to be
31below unity but is more reasonable in size than in the distributed lag model.
Investment dynamics appear to be crucial not only for the e®ect of output on
capital but also for the e®ect of cash °ow variables in investment equations. While
well-known cash °ow e®ects are present in the (¯rst-di®erenced) distributed lag
model, they vanish in the error correction model. This ¯nding con°icts with the
view that cash °ow e®ects can be seen as evidence for the importance of ¯nancial
constraints (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988, 2000). In fact, it rather
suggests that cash °ow may act as a proxy for omitted expected future pro¯tability
variables (Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000; Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay
2003) which becomes insigni¯cant once the investment equation is dynamically
correctly speci¯ed. For this reason I cannot agree with Harho® and Ramb (2001)
when they state that the distributed lag model produces the most appropriate
estimation results. On the contrary, sensitivity of cash °ow coe±cients leads me to
conclude that well documented cash °ow e®ects point at dynamic misspeci¯cation.
32A Appendix
A.1 Data
This appendix describes the calculation of the principle variables used in the esti-
mation and the data sources used in the study.
(Gross) Investment Ii;t
Gross investment is de¯ned as additions to ¯xed tangible assets and structures less
disposals from ¯xed tangible assets and structures.
Sales Si;t
Sales is measured by revenue/turnover from Hoppenstedt, and it is de°ated by
industry-speci¯c output price indices provided by German Statistical O±ce.
Cash °ow CFi;t
Cash °ow is the sum of several variables from Hoppenstedt. Cash °ow includes:
1: Income before extraordinary items
2: Depreciation
3: Deferred taxes
4: Extraordinary items and discontinued operations.
Income before extraordinary items and depreciation are seldom missing from ¯rms'
pro¯t and loss accounts. If information on these two items is missing, cash °ow is
also assumed to be a missing value. The other two items (deferred taxes and
extraordinary items), by contrast, are missing for a large share of companies.
Following Chirinko et al. (1999) I assume their values to be zero when they are
missing. Most ¯rms' pro¯t and loss account in the data set follow the whole
expenditure method. While depreciation for these ¯rms refers to the whole amount
of depreciation in a given year, deprecation of ¯rms applying the cost of sales
method only refers to depreciation attributable to goods sold. These di®erences
in de¯nition are neglected in the construction of my cash °ow variable.
Capital stock Ki;t
Capital input is measured by the real replacement value of equipment and struc-
tures. The real replacement value of capital is not available in the data, and must
33be estimated from historic cost data. The replacement cost value of tangible ¯xed
assets and structures are assumed to equal their historic costs in the ¯rst year a
¯rm appears in the data set (adjusted for previous years' in°ation). Thereafter,
the replacement cost value is updated using the perpetual inventory formula:
P
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where t = 1987;:::;2007,
Kt capital stock,
P I
t price of investment goods,
It real investment,
± depreciation rate.
Depreciation rates of 12.25 percent per year for ¯xed tangible assets and 3.61
percent per year for buildings are assumed. These values are taken from OECD
(1991). As a sensitivity test, I recalculated the capital stock taking a depreciation





There are two price indices: The national price index for investment goods (pI
t)
and the price index for output goods (pS
j;t). The German Statistical O±ce con-
structs pI
t on the country level only (InvestitionsgÄ uterindex). pS
j;t is available for
manufacturers on a disaggregate level (Erzeugerpreisindex): These days ¯rms have
to declare their price of sale for approximately 1,600 representative types of goods.
On the basis of these prices, the Statistical O±ces calculate detailed sales price
information for each industry j. I use this information at the 4-digit industry level.
Rate of economic depreciation ±e
a;j;t
The rate of economic depreciation ±e
a;j;t can be derived from information out of
the national accounts' capital stock (Kapitalstockrechnung), which is provided by
the German Statistical O±ce. The rate varies across assets a, i.e., ¯xed assets
and structures, industries j (4-digit level), and over time. I calculated the rate as
economic depreciation for asset a in prices of 2000 divided by stock of asset a in
34prices of 2000.
Depreciation allowances za;t
Depreciation allowances za;t follow di®erent methods in Germany: While struc-
tures are depreciated on a straight-line basis, ¯xed assets could be depreciated
according to the declining-balance method until 2007. When calculating depreci-
ation allowances, I considered these di®erences. Depreciation allowances also vary
over time as ¯scal rules were changed several times.
Structures: Until 2000, the taxation-relevant lifetime of structures was 25 years.
Since 2001 this lifetime has been prolonged to 331
3 years.
Fixed assets: Until 2000, the yearly rate for the declining-balance method was 0.3.
In 2001 it was reduced to 0.2. If depreciation allowances on the straight-line ba-
sis exceeded those on the declining-balance method, ¯rms were allowed to switch
methods. This privilege is taken into account. Unfortunately, there is no informa-
tion on the relevant lifetime for di®erent ¯xed assets, which vary considerably. I
therefore assumed that the relevant lifetime amounts to 10 years (year 1997) on
average. A research project on depreciation allowances in Germany concludes that
reforms in 1998 and 2001 worsened depreciation allowances by approximately 30
percent (Oestreicher and Spengel 2002). I scaled the average lifetime accordingly
(1998 to 2000: 13 years, 2001 to 2008: 16.9 years).
Firm-speci¯c interest rate ri;t
The ¯rm-speci¯c interest rate ri;t is approximated as interest payments in a given
year divided by long term debt at the end of the year.
Overall yield on corporate bonds rt
In a robustness check, I use the overall yield on corporate bonds rt. This informa-
tion is provided by the German Central Bank in its series\Yields on debt securities
outstanding issued by residents / Corporate bonds / Monthly average"(WU0022).
35A.2 Statutory tax rates
Table A.1 shows the evolution of tax rates over time.
Table A.1: Statutory tax rates 1987-2008
year Corporate income tax Corporate income tax Solidarity
on retained pro¯ts on distributed pro¯ts surcharge
1987 56% 36% -
1988 56% 36% -
1989 56% 36% -
1990 50% 36% -
1991 50% 36% 3.75%
1992 50% 36% 3.75%
1993 50% 36% -
1994 45% 30% -
1995 45% 30% 7.5%
1996 45% 30% 7.5%
1997 45% 30% 7.5%
1998 45% 30% 5.5%
1999 40% 30% 5.5%
2000 40% 30% 5.5%
2001 25% 25% 5.5%
2002 25% 25% 5.5%
2003 26.5% 25% 5.5%
2004 25% 25% 5.5%
2005 25% 25% 5.5%
2006 25% 25% 5.5%
2007 25% 25% 5.5%
2008 15% 15% 5.5%
Sources: Own presentation, corporate income tax law, 1987 to
2008, solidarity surcharge law, 1991 to 2008.
36A.3 Additional descriptives and results of the two-step er-
ror correction model
My sample consists of 4,642 ¯rms which have at least four records in the data set
(Table A.2). Table A.3 shows the distribution of observations over years. Most
¯rms have their headquarters in Western Germany; only about 13 percent of all
¯rms are located in Eastern Germany. All companies were allocated to thirteen
industries according to their main activity as is shown in Table A.4.
Table A.2: Number of records per
company






















pany database, own calcula-
tions, 1987 to 2007.
Table A.3: Composition of the
sample: years
Year Number of observations





















pany database, own calcula-
tions, 1987 to 2007.
37Table A.4: Composition of the sample: industries
Industry Number of
companies
Agriculture, forestry, ¯shery 26
Mining, quarrying 30
Consumer goods, goods for intermediate
Consumption goods industry 791
Producers goods 829
Electricity and water supply 505
Construction 122
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of goods 475
Hotels and restaurants 27
Transport, storage and communication 275
Financial intermediation 68
Real estate and renting 507
Services for private sector 649
Services for public sector and households 338
Total 4,642
Source: Hoppenstedt company database, own calcula-
tions, 1987 to 2007.
Table A.5: Westerlund panel co-integration test
Westerlund test statistic Value z-value p-value
Group-mean tests
Gta -2.904 -28.416 0.000
Gaa -128.683 -573.736 0.000
Panel tests
Ptb -9.550 -40.686 0.000
Pab -18.152 -66.146 0.000
Notes: Westerlund panel co-integration test calculated with
Stata command xtwest (Persyn and Westerlund 2008).
a For group tests: HG
0 : ®i = 0 8i versus HG
1 : ®i < 0 for at least
some i; a rejection should be taken as evidence of co-integration
for at least one of the cross-sectional units.
a For panel tests: HP
0 : ®i = 0 8i versus HP
1 : ®i < 0 8i; a rejection
should be taken as evidence of co-integration for the panel as a
whole.
Sources: Hoppenstedt company database, own calculations, 1987
to 2007.
38Table A.6: Results estimated with two-step error correction model and Generalized
Method of Moments
Ii;t=Ki;t¡1 Two-step estimation
1. step: equilibrium e®ects








2. step: investment dynamics






















Number of ¯rms 3,968
(Number of observations) (24,762)
Sargan-Test (p-value) 0.999
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-value), order 1 0.094
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-value), order 2 0.870
a Note that, while the change in the ¯rst year is given by ®0, the e®ect in the second year cannot
be directly taken out of the regression output. Calculating it leads to an estimate of -0.38:
¡(¾ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ Á) ¡ ®0 ¡ (1 ¡ Á) = ¡(¡1:687 ¡ 1)(¡0:478) ¡ (¡0:422) ¡ (¡0:478) = ¡0:38.
b The e®ect in the second year is given by: (¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ Á) ¡ ¹0 ¡ (1 ¡ Á) = 0:41.
c In every year, 47.8 percent of the remaining gap between current and optimal capital stock
are removed. In the ¯rst year (1¡Á) = 48% directly gives the percentage of capital adjusted.
In the second year the adjustment amounts to (1 ¡ Á) times one minus the adjustment in the
¯rst year ((1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ 0:48) = 48%(1 ¡ 0:48) = 24:96%) and so on.
Notes: Estimates with micro data and Generalized Method of Moments as described in the
text. A full set of time dummies is included. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
The instruments for the ¯rst-di®erenced regression are the values (in levels) of ¢ucci;t lagged
two through seven years and ¢si;t lagged two through ¯ve years.
Source: Hoppenstedt company database, own calculations, 1987 to 2007. 39References
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